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BRIEFING 
ON 
SUBSIDIARITY AND DEMARCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
I. AGENDA FOR THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
The SUBSIDIARITY principle is mentioned in the preamble to the Treaty on European 
Union, in Artide 8, in Article K.3(2)(b) and Article 3b. In order to clarify the application of 
the principle, the Commission Communication on the SUBSIDIARITY principle 
(27 November 1992), the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council (11-12 
December 1992), the Interinstitutional Declaration by the EP, Council and Commission on 
democracy, transparency and procedures for applying the subsidiarity principle (25 
October 1993) and the Interinstitutional Agreement (October 1993) on the application of 
this principle contain check-lists which apply to any consideration of a legislative proposal. 
Subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities may be among the matters to be covered 
by the revision to be undertaken at the 1996/1997 IGC on the basis of the Treaty itself: 
Article 8, which calls for a general review of policies and forms of cooperation 'with the aim 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community'. 
The interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, adopted 
on 25 October 1993, aims to implement the TEU in a democratic, open way. The 
declaration contains a clause whereby its substance may be revised if so requested by 
any of the signatory institutions. 
II. SOURCES 
The European Parliament delivered its opinion in its resolution on the functioning of the 
Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(adopted on 18 May 1995) - paragraphs 12(i-ii), in that on the EP's opinion on the 
convening of the Intergovernmental Conference and the evaluation of the work of the 
Reflection Group (adopted on 13 March 1996)- recital F and paragraph 3, in its resolution 
on the convening of the IGC (adopted on 13 March 1996), in its resolution on the general 
outline for a draft revision of the Treaties (adopted on 16 January 1997) and in its 
resolutions on the European Council meetings in Florence (adopted on 19 June 1996), 
Dublin I (adopted on 23 October 1996) and Dublin II (adopted on 16 January 1997). 
The Commission states its views in its report on the operation of the TEU, adopted on 
1 0 May 1995, and its opinion on strengthening political union and preparing for 
enlargement of 28 February 1996. 
The Committee of the Regions sets out its position in its opinion on the revision of the 
TEU, adopted on 20 April1995. 
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Council/European Councji!Reflectjon Group/Group of Personal Representatives 
The Council's thinking is set out in its report on the functioning of the TEU, adopted on 
1 0 April 1995. 
At the last three meetings of the European Council (in Turin on 28 and 29 March 1996, 
in Florence on 21 and 22 June 1996 and in Dublin on 13 and 14 December 1996) the 
Heads of State and Government of the Member States set out their position on the 
treatment of subsidiarity at the 1996/97 IGC. 
The Reflection Group broached the subject of subsidiarity, demarcation of 
responsibilities, and the hierarchy of Community acts in connection with Item 8 
(Instruments of the Union) of the agenda proposed for its first meeting (on 2 and 3 June 
1995). The 'instruments' topic was discussed by the Reflection Group on 24 and 25 July, 
3 and 4 October, and 13 and 14 November 1995. The views of the Reflection Group are 
set out in its report of 5 December 1995. 
The Group of Personal Government Representatives discussed a paper setting out 
options for the revision of the subsidiarity principle issued by the Italian Presidency on 2 
April 1996, a memorandum from the Netherlands' delegation submitted on 1 0 April 1996 
and a declaration by the German delegation submitted to the meeting of 22 April 1996. 
The report on the IGC's progress submitted to the Florence European Council by the 
Italian Presidency summed up the discussions within the Group of Personal 
Representatives in Chapter IV. The document entitled 'Adapting the European Union in 
the interest of its citizens and preparing it for the future' (CONF 2500/96 of 5 December 
1996), drawn up by the Irish Presidency and submitted to the Dublin European Council, 
included a draft protocol to be annexed to the EC Treaty on the application of the 
subsidiarity principle and Article 3b. 
During the meetings of personal representatives under the Irish Presidency, the 
representatives of Germany and the United Kingdom submitted drafts proposing a 
protocol on the application of the subsidiarity principle (30 August 1996). 
All the Member States have taken a clear-cut official stand on subsidiarity, demarcation 
of responsibilities and the hierarchy of Community acts. The Government of Germany 
and the new Government of Spain have not yet taken an official stand. However, 
statements have been issued by government ministers and representatives, and reports 
and resolutions adopted by national parliaments. As regards the attitudes of the national 
parliaments and their component bodies concerned more directly with Community affairs, 
the Bonn COSAC meeting on 24 and 25 October 1994 discussed the views of the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament on the manner of giving effect to the subsidiarity 
principle. The conclusions of the Dublin COSAC meeting of 15 and 16 October 1996 
proposed that the 'reformed' COSAC (see paragraph 4 of the conclusions for proposed 
ways of improving the operation of COSAC) might also address the subject of subsidiarity. 
Nevertheless, 'any conclusions would be forwarded by way of suggestions and would not 
seek to be binding on the delegations'. A number of national parliaments, including 
chambers composed of regional representatives, have also spoken out on the 1996 IGC 
and matters pertaining to subsidiarity,· demarcation of responsibilities, and the hierarchy 
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of Community acts. In addition, almost half of the political parties represented in the 
Member States have adopted statements, drawn up reports, and delivered opinions on 
matters pertaining to subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities. 
Ill. POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF VIEWS 
A. European Parliament 
1. Bourlanges arfd Martin report and EP resolution of 17 May 1995 
As regards the vertical demarcation of responsibilities (between the EU and the Member 
States) 
(a) Clarifying competencies 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as currently laid down in Article 3b of the 
Treaty, should be maintained and correctly applied. 
Establishment of a fixed list of ELJ and Member State competencies would be too rigid and 
too hard to achieve. Article 235 should be retained, but only used as a last resort and 
after assent of the EP • 
' ... the reform of the Treaties requires institutionalization of the principle of the "necessary 
means••. 
(b) Powers and responsibilities of the Union 
'I. Objectives and policies of the Union 
... The European Union will have to reinforce its existing framework of policies if it is to 
respond to economic and political change and to enhance its credibility in the eyes of its 
citizens. To do this it will have to develop new policies for the future and to strengthen its 
existing policies. Consolidation of this kind is conceivable only in the perspective of a 
merger of the three pillars and within a single institutional framework'. 
The .EE is not advocating a direct transfer of powers in the fields of justice and home 
affairs. On the other hand, it is calling for the Community domain gradually to encompass: 
asylum policy 
policy as regards crossing the Member States' external borders 
policy as regards checks on movements across the Member States' external 
borders 
immigration policy 
policy in relation to third-country nationals 
policy on the fight against drug addiction 
policy to combat serious international crime. 
(c) As regards the horizontal dernarr.ation of responsibilities (i e jn terms of the 
Community institutions) 
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'The Treaty should provide for a separation between the provisions covering the 
Institutions and those covering the content of policies'. 
2. Dury and Maij-Weggen report and EP resolution of 13 March 1996 
(a). Recital F 
whereas the strengthening of existing policies which is needed will not be possible except 
in the context of merging the three pillars in a single institutional and legal framework and 
with due respect for the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, 
(b). Paragraph 3 
The European Parliament 'considers that, by 1999, an adequate system of own resources 
should be established in accordance with the principles of solidarity between the Member 
States, subsidiarity [ ... ], so as to guarantee the autonomy of the Union and the 
effectiveness of its action; [ ... ]'. 
3. EP resolutions on the European Council meetings in Florence (resolution of 19 
June 1996), Dublin 'I' (resolution of 23 October 1996) and Dublin 'II' (resolution of 
16 January 1997). 
The European Parliament did not expand on its existing proposals, which it continued to 
uphold. 
B. European Commission 
In its report on the operation of the Treaty, the Commission drew attention to the 
experience acquired and shortcomings found in implementing the subsidiarity principle 
and raised the possibility of revising that principle. In the Commission's opinion on the 
convening of the IGC, only one sentence on the principle 'do less, but better' is devoted 
to the implementation of the subsidiarity principle. On the basis of these documents, the 
Commission's standpoint can be summed up as follows: 
* Experience acquired in implementing the subsidiarity principle 
According to the Commission, the IGC's task is not to enhance the Union's powers. 
* Shortcomings in the implementation of subsidiarity 
Although the Union institutions have equipped themselves with the means of jointly giving 
effect to the subsidiarity principle, practical experience shows that difficulties arise: 
- in determining the place which subsidiarity should occupy in Community legislative 
procedures; 
- because the legislative texts adopted continue to be unduly detailed on account of the 
desire to protect the specific interests of particular groups. 
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* Proposals to consolidate subsidiarity 
The Commission is not proposing to make any alterations to Article 3b. 
The Commission is not proposing to delete Article 235. 
* Powers and responsibilities of the l Jnion 
With regard to the Community sphere, the Commission is proposing new powers for the 
Union in its policies on employment, energy and public services. However, it is against 
reforming the vertical demarcation of responsibilities. The Commission is critical of the 
demarcation as it affects the areas falling under Community responsibility on the one hand 
and those covered in Titles V and VI on the other. 
C. Council 
* Assessment of the implementation of the subsidiarity principle 
(a) According to the Council report, the introduction of the subsidiarity principle is a useful 
means of enhancing the effectiveness of Community decision-making and bringing the 
Union closer to its citizens. 
(b) There is further room for improvement in the manner of giving practical effect to the 
principle: 
- Community legislation is in some cases still encumbered with an excess of detail; 
- subsidiarity is at times interpreted too sweepingly, and wrongly equated with 
deregulation, posing the risk that the acquis communautaire may be called into question. 
* Powers and responsibilities 
(c) The Council is not proposing to make any alterations to Article 3b. 
(d) The Council is not proposing to delete Article 235. 
(e) The Council is not proposing any new powers for the Union or that the vertical 
demarcation of responsibilities be reformed. 
D. Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions is highly aware of matters pertaining to the principle of 
subsidiarity, its application and implementation and the demarcation of responsibilities 
between the Community, the Member States and regional and local authorities in Europe. 
Moreover, as an institution which does not have rights equivalent to those of the 
institutions, the Committee of the Regions is appealing for its administrative and 
institutional competences to be strengthened. 
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* Proposed new wording of Article 3b 
(a) The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States or regional 
or local authorities exercisin_g the _QQ_wers conferred on them under the national law of the Member States. 
* Implications of the new wording of Article 3b 
(b) The Committee of the Regions is calling for a right of appeal to the Court of Justice, 
whether to bring applications for annulment or to institute proceedings for failure to act. 
It is accordingly proposing to amend the third paragraph of Article 173: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the European 
Parliament, the ECB, or the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. It 
shall likewise have jurisdiction to rule on actions brought by the Committee of the Regions on account of a 
failure to observe the principle of subsidiarity. It shall also be competent to rule on actions brought by 
regions in cases where their legislative powers are affected by a regulation, directive, or decision. 
If, in the 'post-1997' situation, the Committee of the Regions does not become a genuine 
institution within the meaning of the Treaty, it is proposing that Article 175 be amended as 
follows: 
Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail to act, 
the Member States, other institutions of the Community, or the Committee of the Regions may bring an 
action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established. 
(c) The Committee of the Regions wishes to work together with the Commission when the 
latter draws up the legislative programme or green and white papers and issues new 
legislation having a bearing on the powers of the regions and local authorities. 
* Proposal to clarity powers and responsibilities 
(d) The Committee of the Regions is proposing that the powers of the Union and the 
Member States be exactly clarified. It believes that their respective powers should be 
defined, but is not calling for them to be laid down in an itemized list. 
(e) To consolidate the Union's powers, the Committee is calling for: 
Article 75 of the EC Treaty (regional planning, transport across the territory of one 
or more Member States) to be reworded; 
a new version of Article 128 of the EC Treaty (cultural policy to bring about 
European citizenship; cooperation among Member States, regions, cities, and 
conurbations; preservation of the architectural heritage; greater understanding and 
wider dissemination of the culture and history of third countries with which Member 
States have ties; cooperation whereby regions and cities would join forces with the 
third countries, regions, and cities represented in the Council of Europe and with 
Unesco); 
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a new version of Article 130a (cooperation among regions and local authorities on 
an interregional, cross-border basis); 
a new version of Article 130r (state of the environment in the various regions and 
urban and rural districts). 
(f) As regards the introduction of new powers (for the Union), the Committee is calling for 
a: 
new article on policy for cities; 
new article on regional planning policy; 
new article on water management policy; 
new article on energy policy; 
(g) The Committee is proposing that its right to be consulted be extended to include the 
following: 
all matters on which the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is consulted 
Article 130w (development policy) 
Article Be (policy with regard to citizenship of the Union) 
Article 94 (State aids). 
E. Report of the Reflection Group 
'69. The Group stresses the importance of correct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 3b of the Treaty and confirmed by an 
Interinstitutional Agreement on its implementation ... Most members of the Group do not 
feel it advisable to amend Article 3b of the Treaty but think it necessary to ensure that it 
is properly exercised in practice ... ' 
'... It is thought by some members that there is a need for more effective control over 
application of this principle by ... the Commission by "ex-ante" control and the Court of 
Justice by "ex-post" control ... Various representatives have insisted that on the basis of 
the Edinburgh Declaration a Protocol on subsidiarity should be incorporated to the Treaty 
' 
'... A very large majority within the Group is opposed to the request made by the 
Committee of the Regions ... that it be authorized to bring proceedings before the Court 
of Justice for incorrect application of the principle of subsidiarity ... ' 
'125. The Group is not in favour of incorporating a catalogue of the Union's powers in the 
Treaty ... It is therefore in favour of maintaining Article 235 as the instrument for dealing 
with the changing nature of interpretation of the Union's objectives.' 
F. Report by the Italian Presidency on the progress of the IGC 
1. The rapporteur takes the view that the wording of the second paragraph of Article 
3b should be left unchanged. 
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2. 'Should agreement be reached on the principle of incorporating provisions on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty, incorporation could be in the form of 
a Protocol or a Declaration in the Final Act. Such provisions could be based on the 
existing Interinstitutional Agreement, and, if appropriate, the Edinburgh and Birmingham 
Declarations (of the European Council).' 
To this effect, the Italian Presidency has submitted a draft protocol/declaration on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle. 
3. Judicial control of the subsidiarity principle: judicial control of the subsidiarity 
principle 'should continue to be carried out under the arrangements currently laid down 
for controlling the legality of Community acts'. 
The Group of Government Representatives also discussed the possibility of granting 
national parliaments and/or the Committee of the Regions the right to bring matters before 
the Court of Justice for the purposes of controlling respect for the subsidiarity principle. 
4. Political control of the subsidiarity principle: the Group of Government 
Representatives discussed proposals from the French delegation involving the creation 
of a High Parliamentary Council/High Advisory Committee on Subsidiarity comprising 
delegates from the national parliaments, which could control the application of the 
principle. 
G. Report by the Irish Presidency on the general outline for a draft revision of the 
Treaties 
The Irish Presidency submitted a draft protocol to be annexed to the EC Treaty on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle and Article 3b. The draft takes account of the Italian 
Presidency's draft and the proposals put forward by a number of delegations within the 
Group of Government Representatives. It is based on the conclusions of the Edinburgh 
European Council and the Interinstitutional Agreement (EP, Commission and Council) on 
the procedures for implementing the subsidiarity principle. Given that the guidelines on 
implementing the subsidiarity principle were included in the Edinburgh conclusions, the 
Irish Presidency, by contrast with the proposals put forward by a minority of Member 
States, does not propose detailing them in the planned protocol. However, the Presidency 
has restored to the protocol the section on the involvement of the European Parliament 
in the application of the procedures under Articles 189b and 189c of the EC Treaty. The 
Presidency's draft provides that the EP should be informed of the Council's position on 
application of Article 3b in the explanatory memorandum setting out the reasons which led 
the Council to adopt its common position. The Council is also to inform the European 
Parliament of its reasons if it partially or totally rejects a Commission proposal on the 
ground that it does not comply with Article 3b of the Treaty. 
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H. Member States 
Belgium 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting (positio~ of the delegation from the two Chambers of 
the Belgian Parliament): 
European Union directives are too detailed and specific, whereas the only 
obligation they should entail is that of achieving a result. 
2. Official position 
In its note to Parliament on government policy regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference, which it endorsed at its meeting of 28 July 1995, the Cabinet took the view 
that the existing means of giving effect to subsidiarity were operating correctly. It therefore 
did not believe that the principle should be altered or reworked. Belgium considered 
subsidiarity to be a corner-stone of the relationship linking the European Union, the federal 
State, and the regions and communities. The Government did not feel that the powers of 
the Unjon should be set out in a detailed list, since this would scarcely be consistent with 
the changing, ongoing nature of European integration. It also believed that Article 235 of 
the Treaty should remain in place. The second government policy note to Parliament on 
the IGC (18 October 1995) stated that any renegotiation of the subsidiarity definition will 
be possible only if it does not affect the operation and further development of European 
integration and if the distribution of the Member States' internal powers is not subjected 
to control by the Court of Justice. 
3. Other views 
According to Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, Belgium is willing to consider any 
proposal relating to implementation of the subsidiarity principle. However, he does not 
believe that changes or a reworking are genuinely called for at this point in time. As 
regards powers and responsibilities, Mr Dehaene, addressing a PPE Group conference, 
maintained that the legislative activity of the Community institutions should serve only to 
lay down fundamental principles and rules required to attain objectives connected with the 
general interest or the smooth running of the single market. Regarding the proposed lists 
of powers, he felt that any ad hoc, predetermined, and inflexible demarcation of 
responsibilities deriving from a list of powers should be rejected. The Prime Minister does 
not believe that Article 235 should be repealed or potential competence abolished. 
The own-initiative report of 30 March 1995, drawn up by Mr Eyskens on behalf of the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives, recommends that the concept of subsidiarity be 
used with caution, given that some Member States perceive it as a means of removing the 
components of the acq.ujs communautajce from the scope of Community control. It makes 
the point that the subsidiarity principle applies only in areas not falling within the Union's 
exclusive competence. 
The report and the memorandum on the 1996 IGC adopted by the Belgian Senate on 21 
March 1996 express grave reservations about the idea of compiling lists of powers 
conferred on an exclusive basis and comes down against it because it would serve to 
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undermine the Community framework and obstruct the continued development of the 
Union's responsibilities. 
4. Views of the communities and regions (summary of the joint document 
drawn up by the communities and regions and the Special Committee on 
Institutional Affairs, Cdr di 38/95UKK/am) 
The Flemish Government is calling for the subsidiarity principle to be spelt out in greater 
detail. As regards the powers and responsibilities of the Union and the Member States, 
it is calling for clarification of Articles 127 (vocational training), 128 (culture), and 130r 
(there should be a reference to sustainable development in connection with environmental 
policy, which must be more closely linked in future with transport and traffic policy). 
The Government of Brussels Capital Region maintains that the subsidiarity principle 
should be worded in more clear-cut terms. With regard to the powers and responsibilities 
of the Union and the Member States, it is calling for the areas falling within the Union's 
exclusive competence to be laid down in detail (common farm price policy, Community 
rules on competition, Community policy on trade in goods, monetary union). It does not 
believe, however, that the EU's responsibilities should be extended to include energy and 
tourism. 
The Wallonjan Regional Government shares the views of the Flemish Government on 
the institutional status of the Committee of the Regions, the Committee's right to institute 
proceedings before the Court of Justice for failure to observe the subsidiarity principle, 
extension of the scope of mandatory consultation, and clarification of the subsidiarity 
principle. As far as powers and responsibilities are concerned, it is calling for the articles 
on education and vocational training, culture, and health to be broadened and a new 
article to be inserted to deal specifically with sport. 
The German-speaking community is calling for the status of the Committee of the 
Regions to be elevated to that of an institution, the range of matters on which the 
Committee must be consulted to be widened, and for the Committee to be provided with 
its own administrative machinery. 
Denmark 
1. Official position 
In its report entitled 'Agenda for Europe', the Foreign Ministry does not refer explicitly to 
the subsidiarity principle. It does, however, mention three options to explore when reform 
is discussed: 
list of powers, 
detailed definition of the responsibilities of Union institutions, 
new definition of the subsidiarity principle. 
2. Other views 
The Danish 'European Council', comprising Members of the Folketing, the European 
Parliament, various associations, and representatives of the two sides of industry, held a 
meeting in late November 1994, and reform of the Treaties was one of the items on the 
- agenda. 
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The Social Democrats are calling for a clear-cut definition of the subsidiarity principle and, 
as a means to that end, for a list at powers specifying the respective responsibilities of the 
Union, the Member States, and the regions. They maintain that social policy should not 
be the responsibility of the Union. 
The Conservative People's Party believes that the subsidiarity principle must be made one 
of the central topics at the 1996 IGC. More specifically, the Conservatives are calling for 
the areas that it governs to be spelt out in more explicit detail. The powers and 
responsibilities of the Union and the Member States should be clarified. As far as that 
point is concerned, the Conservative view is that policies relating to health, education, the 
arts, and tourism should no longer be the subject of Communitv legislation. 
The Centre Democrats consider that the subsidiarity principle needs to be defined with 
greater rigour. To bring this about, they are calling for a clear-cut, explicit demarcation of 
the responsibilities falling to the Member States, the regions, and the l Jnion, laid down on 
the basis of a list of powers. 
The SF (left-wing socialist party) feels that the definition of subsidiarity will have to be 
tightened up. The powers of the Union will need to be spelt out and made subject to the 
proviso that the action through which they are exercised must proceed on an international 
scale. 
To consolidate the subsidiarity principle, the Liberals are proposing that a list of powers 
be drawn up with the aim of determining which responsibilities should be exercised by the 
Union, the Member States, or regional and local authorities. Policies on social affairs, 
tourism, and the arts should cease to be covered in Community legislation. 
Germany 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the German Bundesrat delegation) 
The Bundesrat notes that the subsidiarity principle removes the need for a good many 
Union acts, for instance in the fields of consumer protection, health, agrarian law and road 
transport. It is calling for a clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and 
the Member States. It has compiled a list of Union provisions and proposals contrary to 
the subsidiarity principle. It is calling for the subsidiarity principle to be applied in areas 
falling within the Community's exclusive competence. 
2. Views of the Federal Government 
The Federal Government (CDU-CSU-FDP coalition agreement) considers that the manner 
of giving effect to the subsidiarity principle will need to occupy a key place at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. At the Conference, the Government will continue to urge 
compliance with, and call for additions to, the 'subsidiarity list', the system whereby Union 
legislation in force will be examined in order to check that it is consistent with Article 3b 
of the Treaty and, where necessary, repealed. It will also endeavour to secure a clear-cut 
demarcation of tasks between the Union and the Member States.-The coalition agreement 
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cites tourism and disaster prevention/civilian rescue services as examples of areas in 
which a review is required in order to ascertain that existing Community powers are 
compatible with the subsidiarity principle. To clarify the meaning of Article 3b of the EC 
Treaty, the Government maintains that the burden of proof should be reversed by deleting 
the final words of the second paragraph, namely' ... and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'. 
3. Other statements issued by the Government and German Ministers 
At the Reflection Group meeting held in Brussels on 24 and 25 July 1995, Mr Hoyer, a 
German member, proposed that a 'sunset clause' be inserted in the Treaty whereby 
a Commission proposal would have to lapse if the Council failed to respond within 
the time-limits laid down and/or 
a Community act would be declared null and void after a given expiry date. 
As far as the official position is concerned, the two government statements on European 
policy (issued on 22 June 1995 and 7 December 1995) and its reply to the oral question 
(GroBe Anfrage) by Mr Christian Sterzing, Member of the Bundestag, and the Alliance '90-
Green Group (see Bundesminister des Auswartigen; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die 
GroBe Anfrage BT-Drs. 13/1471 ... , Bonn, Bundestags-Drucksache 13/3198, 1 December 
1995) speak of strengthening the subsidiarity principle and enforcing it more effectively. 
The document entitled 'Deutsche Ziele fur die Regierungskonferenz' (German aims at the 
IGC), drawn up by the Foreign Minister and published on 26 March 1996, takes the view 
that the subsidiarity principle could be clarified through the introduction of a protocol on 
subsidiarity. 
In his statement to the Commission representation in Bonn on 11 June 1996, Mr Hoyer 
confirmed this proposal and stated that, 'at least', such a protocol should be drawn up on 
the basis of the conclusions of the Edinburgh Council and the Interinstitutional Declaration 
of November 1993. Nevertheless, Mr Hoyer pointed out that the subsidiarity principle 
should not be used as a means of renationalizing the Union. At the meetings of 
government representatives, the German Government submitted a draft protocol on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle. In his government statement to the Bundestag on 
current issues in European affairs and the Dublin (II) European Council, Chancellor Kohl 
stressed that the draft had been agreed with the German Lander with the purpose of 
establishing clear rules allowing strict observation of the subsidiarity principle (see 
Regierungserklarung ... , Presse- und lnformationsamt der Bundesregierung, No 510/96 
of 12.12.1996). With regard to the definition of the scope of application of the subsidiarity 
principle, Germany, in contrast to the Irish Presidency draft, proposes applying the criteria 
listed in Artide 3b(2) to all areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence of the 
Community. Where the Irish Presidency proposes defining the scope of application of the 
principle on the basis of the powers granted to the EC under the Treaty as defined and 
deduced in the interpretation of the Court of Justice, Germany defines exclusive 
competence as the Community alone being authorized to act within the terms of the 
Treaty. It thus appears that the German Government, by restricting the exclusive 
competences of the Community, is seeking to expand the scope of the subsidiarity 
principle. The German proposal thus departs from the Edinburgh conclusions. Finally, 
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several Member States have criticised the German position because they fear that the 
Federal Government is indirectly (through a protocol on subsidiarity) seeking a clear-cut 
demarcation of responsibilities between the European Union and the Member States. 
3. Position of the German Lander 
The Bundesrat resolution adopted on 15 December 1995 sets out the official views of the 
Lander. Regarding subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities, the Lander are calling 
for several Treaty articles to be reworded: 
Article 3b, second paragraph (new wording) 
The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States or regional and local authorities on which powers have been conferred 
by the national law of the Member States. 
As far as the division of powers is concerned, the Bundesrat favours clear-cut, 
explicit demarcation of responsibilities between the EU and the Member States. 
In future, the Union should act only by virtue of expressly defined responsibilities. 
The list of the EU's objectives, at present couched in very vague terms, should be 
replaced by a list of specific powers, divided up according to fields of activity. 
Opting for a half-way house between a list of objectives and a list of powers, it 
might be possible to draw up a list of tasks referring to the specific rules laid down 
in the Treaty as regards the exercise of powers. 
The Lander are thus proposing that Article 3 be rephrased, the introductory clause 
reading as follows: 
Without prejudice to Article 3b and in accordance with the powers conferred on it 
by this Treaty, the Community shall be entrusted with tasks in the following areas 
and that the first paragraph of Article 3b be amended to read: 
The Community shall act solely within the limits of the powers expressly conferred 
on it by this Treaty. 
To give practical expression to the above proposals, the Lander have compiled a 
proposed list of powers to be exercised by the Union on an exclusive, non-
exclusive, or additional basis (see Bundesrat resolution entitled 'Forderungen der 
Lander zur Regierungskonferenz 1996', Drucksache 667/95 (BeschluB), 15 
December 1995, pp. 12-15 and 16-21). 
The Bundesrat is proposing that the words 'energy' and 'tourism' be deleted in 
Article 3(t). 
It is calling for the principle of fair cooperation (Article 5) to be redefined by: 
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1. deleting the final sentence, 
2. inserting the following second and third sentences: 
In exercising its powers, the Community shall likewise take account of the interests 
and internal systems of the Member States. The Community and the Member 
States shall be required to engage in fair cooperation. 
With regard to the formulation of the new powers granted to the Community, in its 
resolution of 8 November 1996 the Bundesrat declared itself in favour of a title on 
employment policy being inserted in the Treaty. 
Greece 
1. Official position 
The Greek Government memorandum 'For a democratic EU with political and social 
content' (March 1996) takes the view that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced in 
a more systematic way. The principle of subsidiarity [ ... ] should be used as an instrument 
for strengthening the role of the citizen, the local authorities and the regions within the 
integration process; it should not be used as a means to alter the acquis communautaire, 
to renationalize Community policies, to retard the development of the Union, or as a 
means to expand unduly the Union's competences.' 
With regard to the powers and responsibilities of the Union, it is calling for: 
more effective policies to guarantee the safety of workers, 
Spain 
a more effective equal opportunities policy, 
a more effective health policy, for example where drugs and Aids are concerned, 
a more effective policy to protect consumers' rights, 
a genuine industrial policy, 
energy and disaster prevention policies established on a formal footing, 
a provision in the Treaty on island regions of the Union. 
1. Official position 
A document submitted to the country's Parliament by the previous Spanish Government 
sets out a specific, accurately defined view on reform of the subsidiarity principle. The 
previous Spanish Government considered that inclusion of an Artide 3b on the subsidiarity 
principle was contrary to the Spanish proposals. 
Regarding the 1996 IGC, it did not advocate a list of powers or deletion of Article 235. 
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France 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the French Senate delegation) 
The delegation feels that, in general, there are too many rules and regulations. It is 
proposing that a body formed by representatives of the national parliaments be made 
responsible for monitoring compliance with subsidiarity (see the background report of 12 
November 1992 on the subsidiarity principle, drawn up on behalf of the Senate Delegation 
for the European Communities by Mr Michel Poniatowski). 
The Senate and the National Assembly are calling for subsidiarity to be applied in areas 
falling within the Community's exclusive competence. 
2. Views expressed by the President and the Government 
The French guidelines for the 1996 IGC (government report of 13 November 1995) 
state that the subsidiarity principle will need to be enforced more effectively. 
The former Minister for European Affairs, Mr Alain Lamassoure, believes that the 1996 
IGC will need to produce an itemized list of powers, couched in consistent, specific terms 
and based on the subsidiarity principle. 
The President of the Republic, Mr Jacques Chirac, considers that the national parliaments 
should be entitled to 'demur on the grounds of subsidiarity', enabling them to have a say 
in the process of framing Union legislation . 
• 
The French Government is proposing that national parliaments should be able to express 
their views at an early stage in the Council's decisions, particularly to enforce subsidiarity. 
Mr Barnier, French Government representative at the IGC, pointed out in his government 
statement on the IGC to the National Assembly on 13 March 1996 that France was 
proposing the establishment of a High Parliamentary Council comprising several 
representatives of each national parliament, which would be consulted on any questions 
of subsidiarity linked to any issues covered by the third pillar. 
During the meetings of government representatives, the French Government submitted 
a memorandum on increasing the involvement of national parliaments in European 
integration, which proposed a consultative association (unilateral vis-a-vis each national 
government and collective vis-a-vis COSAC) of national parliaments to deliver opinions 
on the basis of subsidiarity. To this effect, France has proposed a system of self-referral 
of national parliaments to consider proposals for Community acts in the light of the 
subsidiarity principle. Nevertheless, the government points out that any COSAC opinions 
on subsidiarity should not be considered binding on the Community institutions. 
Several political parties and parliamentary groups represented in the Senate (RPR, 
Centrist Union, and PS) are proposing that a hierarchy of norms/acts be laid down. The 
Social Democratic Centre Party is calling for a hierarchy of acts to be introduced, modelled 
on Articles 34 to 37 of the French Constitution. The party believes that such a step would 
put an end to the present disorder as regards legislation by distinguishing between 
framework laws, laying down the fundamental principles and essential rules of I Jojoo 
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policies, regulations, for which the Council would be solely responsible, and implementing 
texts, which, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, would be the responsibility of 
the Member States. Indeed, Member States should be entitled to appeal directly to the 
Court of Justice whenever the Treaties were infringed in that connection.2 
Ireland 
1. Official· position 
In its White Paper 'Challenges and opportunities abroad', the Irish Government sets out 
its view that the subsidiarity principle '[ ... ] has proved a useful one. If any attempt is made 
at the IGC to define further the concept of subsidiarity it will be important broadly to 
maintain the present balance between Community and member state competence. Apart 
from the Treaty provisions on subsidiarity itself, the importance attached to subsidiarity will 
play a key role in relation to many of the other issues arising at the IGC'. 
Italy 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Chamber of Deputies maintains that the subsidiarity principle 
reflects the desire to coordinate national law and Community rules more closely, without 
seeking to weaken the European Union. The principle applies to areas in which 
Community and national bodies have concurrent competence. However, it should be 
understood in a broader sense, as a yardstick for allocating powers to the different 
standard-setting tiers. 
2. Official position 
The government memorandum on revision of the Maastricht Treaty (presented in the 
Chamber of Deputies on 23 May 1995) notes that the IGC will need to work out a clear 
definition of standard-setting instruments and a hierarchy of legislative acts. As far as the 
subsidiarity principle is concerned, the Government does not believe that the Union should 
be called upon to shoulder an unduly heavy burden of responsibility. Instead, subsidiarity 
should be employed in a flexible way and defined more clearly in order to avert a plethora 
of rules and regulations not only at Union level, but also in the Member States. Moreover, 
the Government does not consider it advisable to draw up a list of areas falling within the 
Union's exclusive competence. The better course, according to the government 
memorandum, would be to lay down a hierarchy of acts consisting of the following three 
tiers: 
2 The future of European integration, Tenth Conference of the CDS, 10 and 11 December 1994. 
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constitutional provisions 
legislative provisions, setting out the general framework for each sector of activity 
or matter to be dealt with; and 
regulations and implementing provisions, which should be the responsibility of the 
Commission unless the Member States are required to take the necessary action 
themselves in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. 
In its 'position of the Italian Government on the IGC' dated 18 March 1996 the Italian 
Government proposes including a protocol in the EU Treaty on the application of the 
subsidiarity prinCiple. 'Adequate importance should be given to the principles of 
subsidiarity, proximity and proportionality[ ... ]. For this reason, we could accept to annex 
to the Treaty a protocol containing some of the elements of the "code of conduct" agreed 
upon at the European Council of Edinburgh. However, the excessive and instrumental 
importance of subsidiarity might weaken the Commission's capacity for proposing, break 
up the Single Market and disperse the uniformity of Community law.' 
As regards introducing new areas of policy in the EU Treaty, the Government takes the 
view that 'the inclusion of certain policies in the Treaty (energy, tourism, civil protection) 
[ ... ]would help the citizens to see the Union more positively.' 
Luxembourg 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Chamber of Deputies delegation considers that there are too many Community rules 
and regulations relating, for example, to public contracts or finance or stemming from the 
propensity to alter the own resources system. 
Implementation of the subsidiarity principle should be supervised by the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament. 
2. Official position of the Government 
The Luxembourg memorandum on the 1996 IGC (issued on 30 June 1995) maintains that 
the subsidiarity principle should be enforced systematically. The Government notes that 
there is nothing in the TEU implying a need to create new powers. 
Speaking on 16 February 1995, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Poos, observed that 
the subsidiarity principle needed to be translated into action to ensure that the Union could 
gain the support of the public at large. 
He proposes that the tasks of the Union and the means/measures to be employed to 
accomplish them should be made a more prominent focus of attention. In his statement 
on foreign policy of 8 February 1996, Mr Poos reiterated these Government priorities. 
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The Netherlands 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Eerste Kamer delegation believes that the subsidiarity principle could shackle the 
Commission's right of initiative and even give rise to abuses. That being the case, it is 
necessary to determine the criteria that would allow or require proposals for Regulations 
or Directives to be withdrawn or revised. The Eerste Kamer rejects the proposal (from the 
German Bundesrat delegation) to apply the subsidiarity principle in areas falling within the 
Community's exclusive competence, since to do so could jeopardize Community 
machinery and policies, needlessly bolster the tendency to pursue bilateral action, and 
undermine the Commission's right of initiative. 
2. Official position 
In its report on institutional reform of the European Union, the Netherlands Government 
maintains that the IGC should concentrate on the smooth running of the internal market. 
Whenever it submits a proposal, the Commission should accordingly say why Community 
rules are necessary. This obligation to state reasons could be laid down in the Treaty. 
Statements of grounds should cover three main points: 
subsidiarity: why are Community rules required? 
proportionality: would it not be sufficient to adopt a less stringent and detailed form 
of regulation? 
costs and benefits, vulnerability to fraud, and compliance with legislation. 
Furthermore, the Government suggests that the admissibility of a proposal be discussed 
in a general public debate in the Council on the basis of the statement of grounds and the 
responses thereto. It believes that checks on compliance with the subsidiarity principle 
should be backed by the necessary guarantees, including the existing possibility of 
instituting proceedings before the Court of Justice. (The Netherlands and Europe - the 
1996 IGC, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1995, p. 284). 
In its report 'Between Madrid and Turin: Dutch priorities on the eve of the 1996 IGC' 
published in March 1996, the Netherlands Government set out its views on including the 
conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council (on the application of the subsidiarity 
principle): 'In order to make these rules effective, the IGC should consider making them 
legally binding'. 
Portugal 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Assembleia da Republica considers that there is a plethora of 
legislation in fields having a strong impact on budgetary policy. On the other hand, there 
are not enough Community rules in areas entailing relatively low Community expenditure. 
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The subsidiarity principle must not, under any circumstances, impede the work of the 
Community or be interpreted a priori. 
With regard to the proposal (from the German Bundesrat delegation) for the subsidiarity 
principle to be applied in areas falling within the Community's exclusive competence, the 
Portuguese Parliament feels that the principle could enable adjustments to be made in the 
areas concerned and, in some cases, provide grounds for certain policies to be returned 
to national control. 
2. Official position 
In its memorandum 'Portugal and the IGC' published in March 1996, the Portuguese 
Government opposes the introduction of a list or catalogue of powers and responsibilities 
of the Union and the Member States. As regards the application of the subsidiarity 
principle, the Government takes the view that the conclusions of the European Council 
and the Interinstitutional Declaration of November 1993 are sufficient instruments. 
3. Position of Parliament 
The country's Parliament studied the implementation of the subsidiarity principle at length 
in February 1995, in its report on the parliamentary response to the revision of the Treaty 
on European Union at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The document notes that 
the concept of subsidiarity does not just relate to the balance between the Community and 
the Member States, but on the contrary, it also has to do with the role of the citizen and 
society vis-a-vis the State, as referred to in Article A of the Treaty. To that extent, it could 
even constitute a first step towards clarification, in a Community for which it is difficult to 
find defining theoretical models. 
The subsidiarity principle has been invoked on numerous occasions by way of an apology 
for devotion to national sovereignty or with the aim of accentuating regional idiosyncrasies. 
It has been invoked to obstruct the development of common policies. However, the 
principle is linked to the idea of effectiveness and, as such, must never be used to call the 
nature of Community action into question, since to do so would be tantamount to 
distortion. In addition, the document produced by the Portuguese Parliament discusses 
how implementation of the subsidiarity principle should be monitored. 
Leaving aside the three-way advance checks by the Commission, the Council, and the 
European Parliament (under the interinstitutional agreement on procedures for 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity, which entered into force at the same time as the 
TEU), the Portuguese Parliament believes that the national parliaments would be qualified 
to exercise political scrutiny. However, it does not say which parliamentary assemblies 
would be in the most suitable position to do so. 
Austria 
1. Official position 
The 'guidelines' on the 1996 IGC, published by the Austrian Government in April or May 
1995 (the document is undated), state that the subsidiarity principle must be strictly 
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enforced. The principle is regarded as a means of apportioning tasks more efficiently to 
each different level, be it European, national, or regional. 
In its 'Basic Positions' published on 26 March 1996, the Austrian Government declares 
itself in favour of the introduction of a protocol on the application of the subsidiarity 
principle based on the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council. With regard to the 
problem of political control of the subsidiarity principle, the Government has declared itself 
open to the active involvement of the national parliaments. Finally, the Government notes 
that it has submitted to the Reflection Group the position of the Austrian provinces aimed 
at granting the Committee of the Regions and regions with legislative powers the right to 
institute proceedings before the Court of Justice. 
Generally speaking, the Government believes that environmental policy and the fight 
against unemployment should constitute priorities for the Community. As regards creating 
new powers for the Union, it feels that: 
existing measures in the field of energy would benefit if the Community were given 
a degree of responsibility for energy policy, 
the TEU should lay down Community responsibilities for policy on disaster 
prevention and emergency action, 
it will not be necessary to confer powers on the Community with respect to tourism 
policy. 
At the meetings of government representatives the Austrian delegation has submitted two 
proposals on inserting a chapter on employment in the EC Treaty. 
The Government considers a possible future hierarchy of acts to be a matter of some 
interest. However, the institutions of the Union will need to be brought into the appropriate 
balance. 
2. Views of the provinces 
On 4 May 1995 the Conference of Provincial Governors and the Conference of Provincial 
Assembly Presidents adopted a detailed resolution on the 1996 IGC. The provinces are 
taking a similar line to the Committee of the Regions as regards the subsidiarity principle 
and the right of the Committee of the Regions and regional authorities with legislative 
powers to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice. As far as redefinition of the 
subsidiarity principle is concerned, the new wording of Article 3b, second paragraph, 
proposed by the Governors' Conference is similar to the proposal put forward at their 
Conference by the Ministers of the German Lander responsible for European affairs. In 
addition, the provinces are calling for the Committee of the Regions to be involved in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on subsidiarity or in a new 'Subsidiarity Chamber'. 
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Finland 
1. Official position 
In its statement to Parliament on 14 February 1995, the Finnish Government maintained 
that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced rigorously and with care. 
The 'Memorandum concerning Finnish points of view with regard to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference of the EU', issued on 18 September 1995, makes the point 
that subsidiarity is a political rather than legal principle. According to this document, 
subsidiarity should be the guiding principle where extension of the Union's powers is 
concerned. 
The Finnish Government's communication to Parliament on Finland's ideas and objectives 
in anticipation of the 1996 IGC (issued on 27 February 1996) states that there is no need 
to amend Article 3b of the Treaty. To make for greater clarity, a protocol on the 
subsidiarity principle, based on the Edinburgh Declaration, should be incorporated in the 
Treaty. 
Sweden 
1. Official position 
According to the Swedish Government, which stated its position on the IGC in an initial 
document drawn up for Parliament in July 1995 entitled 'Sweden's interests in the run-up 
to the 1996 IGC' and, in late November 1995 (after holding several rounds of consultations 
with a parliamentary group called upon to consider the earlier document) adopted 
'Swedish government report 1995/96:30: the 1996 EU IGC', the subsidiarity principle will 
be one of the main items on the agenda for the 1996 IGC. The Government maintains that 
the principle should be enforced more effectively, but is not in favour of amending the 
relevant articles of the Treaty. It is calling in this connection for a right of initiative to be 
granted to the European Parliament with respect to Union legislative acts. 
At the end of a joint hearing organized by the Swedish Government and Parliament on 22 
and 23 May 1995, the Government appointed an ad hoc committee, the Swedish 
Parliamentary Committee on the 1996 IGC, which will deal with implementation of the 
subsidiarity principle. On 19 February 1996 the committee published a report which 
considered that 'the principle of subsidiarity need not be mentioned in detail in the Treaty. 
The Committee did not feel there was any need for a catalogue listing the powers 
invested, or not, in the EU. Article 235 should be retained' . 
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United Kingdom 
1. Bonn COSAC meeting 
The British parliamentary delegation maintained that not only the number of European 
regulations, but also European law as such, which was often perceived as a diktat or a 
form of interference, was giving rise to very widespread anxieties extending beyond 
individual sectors. Generally speaking, the subsidiarity principle had been welcomed in 
the United Kingdom, although there were still considerable doubts as to its effectiveness 
in practice. 
The two parliamentary committees specializing in European affairs have expressed 
misgivings about various proposals for Directives drawn up by the Commission. 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities believes that the 
subsidiarity principle should apply in areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence. 
2. Views of the Government 
In the document 'A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Union 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996' published in March 1996, the UK Government 
proposed to the IGC that guidelines on subsidiarity be included based on the conclusions 
of the Edinburgh European Council. With regard to the legal manner of including such 
provisions, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Rifkind, confirmed in his speech to the House of 
Commons on 21 March 1996 that his government proposed annexing a protocol to the EU 
Treaty based on the Edinburgh guidelines (see also Mr Major's speech at Goldsmiths Hall 
on 19 June 1996). 
On the subject of 'sunset clauses', the document notes that the UK has proposed such a 
clause under which 
Commission proposals would lapse if the Council did not react within a set time-
limit and/or 
a Community act would be deemed to have lapsed after a fixed expiry date. 
The United Kingdom submitted a draft protocol on the application of the subsidiarity 
principle at the meetings of government representatives. In contrast to the Irish 
Presidency draft, the United Kingdom proposal seeks to incorporate the guidelines 
included in the Edinburgh conclusions into the protocol and to strengthen court 
supervision of the application of the principle. In the government's opinion, the power of 
the courts to monitor the subsidiarity principle will derive from the precise definition of the 
procedures to be applied when Community institutions legislate within the framework of 
the EC Treaty. 
3. Other government views 
According to Mr Davis, the British junior Minister responsible for European affairs, the 
subsidiarity principle implies that action should be taken at Union level if, and only if, better 
results can be obtained jointly than by each country in isolation, and even when that is the 
case, inopportune authoritarianism has -to be avoided (Le Monde, 14 June 1995). In the 
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same article, he put forward some ideas as to how the subsidiarity principle might be 
reformed. One option to which he referred was that of strengthening the provisions of the 
Treaty by inserting an additional reference, the wording of which had already been agreed 
in Council. Alternatively, the national parliaments could be given the right to demur on the 
grounds of subsidiarity. He said that the United Kingdom was willing to consider all 
possible means of achieving the above ends . 
At meetings of the Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC, Mr Davis has proposed that the 
Treaty incorporate a 'sunset clause requiring the Commission to withdraw proposals which 
had not been agreed within a certain time' (Statement on the outcome of the 1996 IGC 
study group meetings of 1 0/11 July and 24/25 July 1995, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 26 July 1995). Responding to '1996 IGC', a report drawn up by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities, the Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Baroness Chalker of Wallasey, wrote: 
'The Government takes the view that subsidiarity is a legal as well as political principle, 
and will therefore be taking steps at the IGC to strengthen the application, and improve 
the justiciability, of Article 3b'. 
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I. Conclusions 
1. The subsidiarity principle and implementation of Article 3b 
Amendment Yes No Suggestions 
EP X Retain the principle and enforce it correctly 
-
Commission X Continue to simplify existing legislation and clarify the role 
of subsidiarity in legislative 
procedures 
Council X Clarify the role of subsidiarity to prevent it posing a 
challenge to the acquis communautaire 
COR X Reword Articles 3b, 173, third paragraph, and 175 TEC 
Belgium X 
Denmark x1 
Germany X The Government is proposing a protocol on subsidiarity 
amending the Birmingham and Edinburgh conclusions. 
The Lander are proposing to reword Article 3b and to 
rephrase Article 5 accordingly. 
Greece X Enforce the subsidiarity principle more systematically 
Spain X 
France Senate Enforce subsidiarity more effectively; establishment of a 
X High Council/Advisory Committee of National Parliaments 
responsible for monitoring the principle. In October 1994 
the Senate called for the subsidiarity principle to be 
extended to cover areas falling within the Community's 
exclusive competence 
Ireland X 
With the exception of the Liberals, all Danish political parties are calling 
for the subsidiarity principle to be spelt out, clarified, and defined more 
accurately. 
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Amendment Yes No Suggestions 
Italy X 
• Luxembourg X Enforce the principle systematically 
Netherlands X(+/-) The Commission should be required under the Treaty to 
justify its legislative proposals in terms of subsidiarity, 
proportionality, and the financial aspects 
Portugal X 
Austria X(+/-) Rigorous enforcement of the subsidiarity principle 
Finland X Rigorous enforcement of the subsidiarity principle 
Add a protocol on subsidiarity to the TEU 
Sweden X 
United Kingdom X Government: Article 3b should be subject to Court jurisdiction 
In October 1994 the House of Lords called for the 
subsidiarity principle to be extended to cover areas 
falling within the Community's exclusive competence 
• 
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2. Incorporation in the EU Treaty of a declaration/protocol based on the Edinburgh 
conclusions 
EP: no 
Commission: yes to the Irish Presidency draft 
Council: 
COR: 
Belgium: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Denmark: no 
Germany: 
Federal Government: yes to its own draft protocol 
Lander: yes 
Greece: reserved 
Spain: no 
France: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Ireland: yes to the Irish Presidency draft 
Italy: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Luxembourg: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Netherlands: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Portugal: reserved 
Austria: yes, no preference among the proposed drafts 
Finland: no 
Sweden: no 
United Kingdom: yes to the UK draft 
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3. Vertical demarcation of powers conferred on the Union, the Member States, and 
the regions/Lists of powers 
The following favour vertical demarcation of powers by means of: 
EP: 
Commission: 
Council: 
COR: 
Belgium: 
Denmark (parties): 
Germany: 
Greece: 
Spain: 
France: 
Ireland: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
Portugal: 
Austria: 
Finland: 
Sweden: 
hierarchy of acts incorporating an 'implementing acts' category 
harmonization of the areas encompassed within the Community domain with 
those covered in Titles V and VI 
no 
clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and the Member 
States 
no 
list of the respective powers of the Union, the Member States, and the regions 
clear-cut demarcation of tasks between the Union and the Member States 
no 
no 
in general, itemized list of powers, hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between 
framework laws and implementing acts. This initial proposal is no longer being 
put forward. 
no 
hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between laws and regulations. This initial 
proposal is no longer being put forward. 
no 
no 
no 
better demarcation of the respective tasks of the EU, Member States, and the 
regions. This initial proposal is no longer being put forward. 
no 
no 
United Kingdom: no 
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4. Article 235 and potential competence 
The following: advocate are opposed to repeal of Article 235 
\. 
EP X ~ 
Commission X 
Council 
COR 
Belgium X 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece X 
Spain X 
France X 
Ireland X 
Italy X 
Luxembourg X 
Netherlands X 
Portugal X 
Austria X 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom X 
• 
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5. Proposals to 'curtail' the Union's responsibilities 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Government 
Lander 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Health, Education, Arts, Tourism 
Rescue services, Tourism, Employment 
Energy, Tourism 
Tourism 
Social policy, Tourism, Energy, Employment 
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6. Proposals for new (or wider) responsibilities for the Union, excluding Titles V and 
VI (see Briefings on these subjects) 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Social policy, Equal opportunities, Energy, CAP, Fisheries, 
Environment, Consumers, Transport, Tourism, Public services, 
Education, Training, Youth, External economic relations, 
Employment, Sport, Civil protection 
Employment, Energy, Public services, 
Policy for cities, Regional planning policy, Water management 
policy, Energy policy 
Sport, Public services 
Employment 
Social policy, Civil protection, Animal protection 
Safety of workers, Employment, Equal opportunities, Health, 
Consumers, Industry, Energy, Civil protection, Tourism, Island 
regions 
Employment, Public services, Outermost regions 
Public services, Outermost regions 
Tourism, Civil protection, Nuclear safety 
Employment, Energy, Tourism, Civil protection 
Employment, sport 
Employment 
Energy, Tourism, Civil protection, Outermost regions 
Employment, Energy, Civil protection 
Employment 
Employment 
Animal protection, Fisheries quota-hopping 
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7. National parliamentary control of subsidiarity principle 
Control by COSAC Control by national 
parliaments 
Commission no 
European Parliament no no 
Belgium Parliament: Parliament: 
yes yes 
Denmark yes(+/-) yes(+/-) 
Germany no no 
Greece no no 
Spain no reserved 
France yes yes 
Ireland no no 
Italy - -
Luxembourg no yes 
Netherlands no -
Austria no yes 
Portugal no -
Finland - -
Sweden no no 
UK no yes 
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